

“Strengthening Partner Capacity for Complex Operations”

PREPARED STATEMENT

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Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on ways the Department of Defense can build and harness partnership capacity, both here and abroad, to better meet complex contingency needs. This is an important topic for inclusion in the upcoming Congressional Defense Review (CDR). I appear before you today speaking on my own behalf. These views are my own and do not represent those of the National Defense University or of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Introduction

Professor Bernard Cole joins me at the table to testify on China. These two topics--building partnership capacity and China--though apparently different have an important connection. From an Armed Services Committee point of view, they deal with the two major challenges facing our defense planners: the possibility of a major conventional war and the near certainty of future complex operations.

Most future overseas military deployments will at some point require major civilian contributions and coalition partner participation. The changing nature of conflict as well as the nature of overseas operations will mean that deployments will not involve the military alone, especially over longer periods of time. We refer to this as complex operations—a cluster of capabilities that go beyond the military and include political, economic, social, and reconstruction tasks. Stability and reconstruction operations are the most demanding of these. Complex operations will entail greater involvement not only of interagency partners, but also contractors and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and coalition and allied partners. Most importantly, ultimate military success will depend in large part on how well these partners perform. Maintaining and winning the peace is as important as winning the war. The Department of Defense needs fully capable civilian and international partners, and must do what it can to bolster the capacities of both.

Of these three categories of partners—the interagency, contractors and NGOs, and allies—the interagency is the least prepared. Contractors move quickly. NGOs are experienced and already in the field. Many of our allies have developed some capacity in the area of complex operations as seen in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia, but the capacity could be better organized.

We define the Department of Defense’s responsibilities for complex operations in terms of two core responsibilities and two contingency responsibilities:

Its two core responsibilities are:

- Conducting military operations against organized opposition forces in order to end hostilities and create a secure environment for reconstruction.
- Building local military and defense-institutional capabilities that can sustain security throughout reconstruction and contribute to a viable democratic state.

Its two contingent responsibilities are:

- Ensuring public safety, order and law enforcement until there are proper non-military security services (local or international) available and able to do so.
- Providing urgent and vital public services until time and security conditions permit civilian reconstruction assistance to commence.

For the Pentagon to be successful in these missions, especially the contingent missions that are not permanent for the military, it is in its interest to act on a number of areas:

- *Improve* its own capacity for complex contingencies.
- *Encourage* other agencies to expand and make deployable their capacities.
- *Support* other agencies with training and education, personnel exchanges, net-centric capabilities, and financial backing.
- *Develop* quick reaction relationships with contractors and closer ties to NGOs.
- *Work* with allies and international partners to improve and organize their capacities.

Improving DOD Capacity

The first area deals with changes within the Department, which is where this committee has the most impact. Among the many ideas in circulation is the notion of legislating a Goldwater-Nichols II for the interagency, which would take cooperation to another level beyond service “jointness.” Whereas Goldwater-Nichols I was about one Department, legislating jointness for the interagency would touch on the jurisdiction of many committees, making the proposition difficult. This committee is perhaps best equipped to encourage the Department of Defense to perform the four responsibilities mentioned above. In the last four years, DoD has taken several constructive steps. The most recent of these is a draft Directive that establishes stability and reconstruction operations as a priority and assigns various responsibilities to Under Secretaries, COCOMs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for these types of operations. This is a very important step.

In my view, implementation of the Directive should focus on two areas. First, and this idea is supported by the Council on Foreign Relations, we need a focal point on the civilian and the military sides of DoD. So far, there is a distribution of responsibilities among various offices and Services without a strong focal point. Current responsibilities rest with SOLIC which is doing a very good job but does not have the resources or bureaucratic structure to be a successful executive agent. Therefore it is important to find ways to strengthen OSD especially if it becomes executive agent. For example, the Council on Foreign Relations specifically suggests establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. On the military side, JFCOM, SOCOM, and the COCOMs all have pieces of S&R. What is needed to implement the Directive is a Standing Joint Task Force to be an advocate and to develop the forces for joint S&R tasks.

Second, the military is working to develop more capabilities for complex operations, shifting assets from old missions to new ones, for example, from artillery and air defense

to MPs and civil affairs. We need to expand civil affairs through recruiting for targeted expertise and train MPs for constabulary missions. But more needs to be done. In a study I published with my colleague Stuart Johnson, we recommended some bold new structures for the Pentagon, which would be based around newly organized groups. The notion is to organize joint S&R groups from civil affairs, MPs, combat engineers, PSYOPs, intelligence, and medical units and train them together as a group. New synergies would develop from these various specialists training together. The S&R groups would then be attached to combat groups. Together they would deploy, with the combat groups providing the stability and the S&R groups providing the early reconstruction work. Reconstruction would not be relegated to second tier status. The Council on Foreign Relations puts it like this: We need to recognize the need for a different skill set to conduct stabilization missions and adjust force structure and associated training accordingly: knowledge of regions and associated history and customs, language skills, and intelligence and counterintelligence expertise are in great demand, as is the need for more engineers, logistics, and communications personnel.

Encouraging Civilian Capacity Building

The second area is less in this committee's immediate jurisdiction but important to the functioning of DOD nonetheless: encouraging other agencies to develop their capabilities. Much is owed to Senators Lugar and Biden who introduced the "Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2005," which focused attention on this area. This act, which has not yet passed the full Senate, would establish as a core mission of the Department of State and USAID a civilian response capability to carry out reconstruction and stabilization activities. As a result of the bill, State stood up the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which is the core around which to build any new civilian capacity. A Presidential document is currently in circulation that establishes S/CRS as the coordinator for USG efforts for the conduct of S&R activities. S/CRS is under-resourced, however, and this committee might find ways to encourage sister committees to fund this office and agree to direct financing from the Department of Defense during crises. Strengthening S/CRS is critical to the organization of civilian assets for S&R operations.

Stronger NSC and need for an Executive Order

Other agencies' capabilities must also be strengthened and the NSC must play a stronger role in coordinating the interagency effort. This stronger role would not be operational. For example, CSIS calls for an NSC Senior Director and an office for Complex Contingency Planning to lead the development of integrated interagency plans for complex operations. CSIS further advocates the creation of a planning office in each of the key civilian agencies (in State, this would be S/CRS) to participate in the interagency planning process. This would also require a strong NSPD or EO similar to PDD 56 to assign authorities and responsibilities and also create planning and operational mechanisms, oversight and accountability.

Enhanced Planning

Coordinated planning did not work well in Iraq, but steps are being taken to correct this. Significant work has been done to enhance planning capabilities by the Defense Science Board, by S/CRS and by Joint Forces Command. Interagency planning must be conducted at three levels: strategic, contingency, and operational. First, more needs to be done at the strategic level to implement the National Security Strategy. Second, with regard to contingency planning, the Defense Science Board study of 2004 proposes the creation of cross-government, country specific, contingency planning and integration task forces. Task force membership would include representation from all involved USG agencies. Task force strategic plans would be supported by “component” plans prepared by the regional combatant commanders, thus better integrating S&R plans with operational plans for combat. While interagency involvement is essential, the possibility that it might slow down the process must be addressed. Third, there is operational planning which will connect the war planning with the post-conflict planning. Here, we need to find a mechanism that strikes the right balance between DoD’s need to keep war plans close hold and the need to develop concurrent S&R planning with the interagency. DoD should be encouraged to continue to work closely with S/CRS in developing planning procedures.

Deployable Capability

This brings us to the development of a deployable civilian capability. S/CRS has developed notional plans for a civilian reserve corps with a target of 3,000 personnel specialized in transitional security, essential services and civil administration skills. USAID has reorganized and developed plans to build surge mechanisms of an additional 700 to 1,600 people. We need a bold approach that involves a multi-layered effort to include the transformation of AID, building a full-up Civilian Reserve Corps and harnessing the ability of other agencies to respond to complex contingencies. Aside from State and AID, other agencies do not have the bureaucratic structures or deployable assets in place for this function. DoD should support the establishment of offices for overseas complex operations within all relevant civilian Departments and Agencies. The Departments of Justice, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, DHS, and others should all have designated offices to coordinate with S/CRS and to identify capabilities that can be deployed when required. Of course, additional authorities and funding will be required for such deployments.

Expanding COCOM Capabilities

Most COCOMs have Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) and Political Advisors (POLADs), neither of which was designed for the purpose of being the interagency link for complex operations. That said, the JIACG is the only functioning full time “interagency” element at the COCOM, and serious consideration should be given to expanding these groups into “full spectrum” capabilities beyond their current limited focus on counterterrorism and counter narcotics. As a larger deployable civilian

capability is developed, we need to ensure interaction with the capabilities that already exist, to include civil affairs units, USAID's DART, JIACGs and POLADs. Consideration should also be given to strengthening the role of POLADs from that of an advisor to one that represents and can speak for the Department of State, better linking the COCOM to the Department of State.

Command relationships

Command relationships between the civilians and the military need to be carefully worked out in advance. Historically, there have been three different models. The first, used for war or insurgency, has the military in charge. A civilian will run the civilian operation but will report to the general running the military operation. Vietnam and the CORDS program is an example. The second is a dual arrangement, used in Phase 4 post-conflict operations. A civilian leads the reconstruction operation, but since the environment may not be completely secure, there is still a military presence, so the two coexist and work in partnership. We have seen a couple of different variants of this model in Afghanistan and Iraq. The third has the civilians in charge of the entire operation. Examples of this model can be found within the UN where the Secretary's Special Representative will be in charge of an overall effort and the UN military component will report to him. The kind of command relationship we are talking about for complex operations is usually the second one, and getting the partnership right is critical.

Supporting the Interagency

A strengthened NSC structure, coordinated interagency planning at all levels, a deployable civilian capacity and modalities for interagency deployments are areas where this committee can encourage growth. But it also needs to support interagency capacity building. The CDR should consider some ways the Pentagon will be prepared to support the capacity building efforts of our civilian counterparts. For example, Pentagon planners are recognized throughout the government as the best in the field. Defense planners should train, work, and exercise with people in other Departments to teach them about long-term operational planning. The Pentagon can also be actively involved in personnel exchanges. DoD personnel could be assigned to other Departments for the purpose of organizational capacity building in those agencies for complex contingencies, much like that which is currently being done with S/CRS.

Another area the Pentagon can support the interagency is education and training. The Council on Foreign Relations recommends the development of appropriate educational programs and doctrine for civilian-led stabilization operations and further suggests that the next generation of military officers needs to understand that stabilization is a core mission not an adjunct to combat. One critical step the National Defense University has taken is a fledgling program that uses simulations to discuss and test innovative approaches to complex crises and to encourage interagency cooperation. It is small and under funded but could be the core for a larger program that will be necessary to integrate the interagency into S&R operations. NDU is cooperating with the Foreign Service

Institute and the Army War College. This program should also be fully resourced. CSIS has suggested a much bolder approach—the formation of a National Security University and a new national security career path that would give career professionals incentives to seek out interagency experience, education, and training.

DOD can also make an important contribution to interoperable communication and net-centric capabilities. The capability the military has to coordinate in the battlefield has not been applied to complex operations and extended to other partners. We have an ongoing study at NDU that looks at ways to adopt these techniques to complex operations. We can make this study available to the committee.

Finally, existing DOD authorities do not have enough flexibility to support civilian partners. The Department is currently seeking the authority to transfer goods, services and funding to S/CRS to bridge a gap in the near-term ability of S/CRS to deploy quickly in a crisis.

Developing Contractor and NGO Relationships

As seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, contractors and NGOs play an important role in post-conflict situations. The Pentagon should develop these very important relationships with better modes of communication and clearer rules of engagement. Contractors and NGOs should have clear expectations of what the Pentagon can provide in terms of security and logistical support. Should the capacity-building efforts of S/CRS and other agencies not be realized, the Pentagon will have to do more to bolster this category of relationships since these will be the only resources it will have to draw upon. Contractors and NGOs will be a hedge against potentially less-than-adequate responses from other agencies

Congress could also consider rationalizing federal contracting rules, particularly in areas where our armed forces are at risk, to encourage faster development of the economy and more local participation in contracting opportunities. Another crucial area to consider is enhancing the role of the private sector in post-conflict reconstruction. To encourage investment and trade, Congress could consider expanding the mandate of OPIC and ExImBank, providing tax incentives, and facilitating access to commercial insurance products. These actions would help speed up the stabilization process and shorten military deployments.

Improving International Partner Capabilities

This brings me to the last of the partnerships, the one with allies and coalition partners. Any end game strategy will involve effective international partners who are familiar with the geography, language, and culture of an area. The most successful example of this is Bosnia, where we conducted military operations with NATO and handed off the post-conflict phase to the EU. A successful international partnership requires two things: getting our diplomacy right and improving the institutional capacity of our allies. If we address the issue of political will early on and support efforts for more robust capabilities, we will have a powerful tool. We should support development of a new NATO

stabilization and reconstruction capability, including deployable European constabulary forces. The African Union can perform peacekeeping missions but it does not have the combat forces necessary for humanitarian interventions to stop genocide. We need to help provide that capability. While there is some skepticism toward UNDPKO operations, a recent RAND study demonstrates that they are very often successful. We should support efforts to reform the UNDPKO. DoD should take the lead in strengthening planning, military, and technical links with the UNDPKO. Each operation undertaken by the EU or AU or UN will lighten the burden on our combat forces.

Legislative Changes

The CDR can set the stage for new legislation. That legislation might underline the importance of complex operations and assure that forces dedicated to this mission are properly organized, trained, equipped, and resources. It could also encourage the Defense Department to provide training, assistance and in time of crisis even resources to other agencies that assist in complex operations overseas.

I should also mention that the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Control Export Act are outdated. We are operating now in a new international system. I served on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for eight years and was responsible at the staff level for both of these acts. A lot of restrictions were added to both pieces of legislation during the Cold War that reflect the realities of a different time. Congress and the Executive Branch should work together to review both laws and make necessary adjustments.

Conclusion

The strategic environment has changed and our missions have shifted. The ability to dominate any opponent or set of opponents on the battlefield must remain our military's top priority. We must be able to win all of our wars with a wide margin of safety. But now we face new challenges that require complex operations to win and keep the peace. To successfully meet these new challenges, the Department is making significant changes and more are needed. But our military cannot succeed in complex operations alone. This is why it is more important than ever for the Department to bolster the capacity of our partners in the interagency and in allied countries.